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Abstract
We present an epistemological scheme of natural sciences inspired in
Peirce's pragmaticist view, stressing the role of the phenomenological map,
that connects reality and our ideas about it. The scheme has a recognis-
able mathematical/logical structure which allows to explore some of its
consequences. We show that seemingly independent principles as the re-
quirement of reproducibility of experiments and the Principle of sucient
reason are both implied by the scheme, as well as Popper's concept of
falsiability. We show that the scheme has some power in demarcating
science by rst comparing with an alternative scheme advanced during
the rst part of the XX century (which we call Popper-Einstein and has
its roots in Hertz). Further, the identied dierences allow us to focus
in the construction of Special Relativity showing that it uses an intuited
concept of velocity that does not satisfy the requirements of reality in
Peirce. We track the problem to hidden hypothesis in Einstein's work.
While the main mathematical observation has been known for more than
a century it has not been investigated from an epistemological point of
view, probably because the socially dominating epistemology in physics
discourages so doing.
1 Introduction
Ever since the Greeks attempted to conceive an understanding of the world, a
duality a relation of two worlds has been in the centre of the scene. In various
Socratic dialogues (e.g., (Plato 2014)), Plato refers to the world of Forms, or
Ideas, an eternal world of perfection, as well as to the world of imperfect copies,
our material world. Plato's theory of forms is well known and has deserved
extensive discussion1, we will simply observe that the duality it introduces has
been a substantial part of epistemology since then. We shall call Ideal World,
1See e.g., Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy(accessed 2020-04-23)
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IW, the World of Forms and Sensible World, SW, the material world, the world
accessible with our senses. We credit Galileo for being one of the rst in ad-
vancing that the IW was populated by a mental operation he called idealisation
that produced perfect2 (or at least perfected) models of the observable (Galilei
1914). Several authors have worked along this conception. One of the most
remarkable has been Husserl 1983 who used the term ideation to indicate the
process by which the observable was incorporated to our perception as ideas.
Piaget and García 1989 made a clear distinction between the observed, that
what reaches our senses, and the facts, the ideated, that what is incorporated
to our knowledge as perceived. All these authors have in common not only the
duality between both worlds but the existence of correspondences between ele-
ments in one and the other world. Plato emphasised the relation IW
Γ7−→ SW
while Galileo stressed the inverse relation SW
Π7−→ IW . We shall call the pair
(Π,Γ) the phenomenological map. As far as we know, the properties and the
consequences regarding the assumed existence of a phenomenological map have
received little attention in the past. The matter was considered in Margenau
and Mould 1957 and Dingle 1960a, who referred to the phenomenological map
as rules of correspondence but they did not advance into the implied logical
structure. In turn, (Feigl 1970) reminds us in his analysis of the orthodox view
of theories:
In the picturesque but illuminating elucidations used, e.g., by Schlick,
Carnap, Hempel, and Margenau, the "pure calculus," i.e., the un-
interpreted postulate system, "oats" or "hovers" freely above the
plane of empirical facts. It is only through the "connecting links,"
i.e., the "coordinative denitions" (Reichenbach's terms, roughly
synonymous with the "correspondence rules" of Margenau and Car-
nap, or the "epistemic correlations" of Northrop, and only related to
but not strictly identical with Bridgman's "operational denitions"),
that the postulate system acquires empirical meaning.
and proposes a more strict correspondence, that he names bridge laws:
Let me emphasize once more that this manner of regarding theories
is a matter of highly articial reconstruction. It does not in the
least reect the way in which theories originate. Correspondence
rules thus understood dier from bridge laws in that the latter make
empirical assertions.
In the present work we intend to show that the phenomenological map is a
key element in a traditional conception of science. Its construction implies
foundational reasoning principles such as Leibniz' principle of sucient reason
(see e.g., Ballard 1960) and the related no-arbitrariness-principle (NAP) (H G
Solari and M A Natiello 2018). We will show that other conceptions of science,
2Perfection must be understood here in the sense of being faultless and capturing/creating
the essence of the World. Ultimately, the two worlds can only be understood as one in front
of the other, reciprocally dening themselves as in all the fundamental dialectic relations.
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such as that put forward by Popper (1959) and (Einstein 1936; Einstein 1940) go
back to the platonic view, in the sense that only the map Γ (the interpretation)
is (precariously) considered and, because of this, they are forced to introduce
an independent symmetry principle (somehow borrowed from the traditional
conception). Finally, we will show that the map Π cannot be completed for
Special Relativity (SR), which results then in a theory that depends on previous
epistemic decisions.
2 A pragmaticist view of the traditional3 concept
of science
Charles Peirce found convenient to rename his philosophical standpoint from
pragmatism into pragmaticism, his argument being:
So then, the writer, nding his bantling "pragmatism" so promoted,
feels that it is time to kiss his child good-by and relinquish it to its
higher destiny; while to serve the precise purpose of expressing the
original denition, he begs to announce the birth of the word "prag-
maticism," which is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers.(Peirce
1955, p.255)
We will try to keep our view within Peirce's original view, knowing that every
reader is a potential kidnapper of the term (the present authors included).
Peirce introduced the fundamental concept of Reality as follows:
Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated
in more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose char-
acters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those
Reals aect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our
sensations are as dierent as are our relations to the objects, yet,
by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by
reasoning how things really and truly are; and any man, if he have
sucient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to
the one True conclusion. The new conception here involved is that
of Reality.(Peirce 1955, p. 18)
Since reality is independent of the subject we can say that a fundamental re-
quirement of the real is to be objective or at least intersubjective. While the
observations are prone of circumstances such as where and when, as well as the
observer, the facts have been usually deprived of such elements. The ideated
3We leave to Section 3 a short explanation on how epistemology, particularly in physics,
changed after the irruption in history of the Berlin school of physics with Helmholtz and
Hertz among others. We designate as traditional the epistemological approach prevailing
since Galileo until Maxwell (died 1879) and new the mature form that reached the evolution
of the thoughts initiated at Berlin (to put a date, 1870 with Helmholtz becoming head of the
physics department). The transition time was then the epoch in which the belief in a material
ether was prevalent.
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facts are the reality in Peirce, and these facts are the point upon what two
observers can agree (Peirce 1955, p. 150). We also learn about hypothesis in
Peirce, although we prefer to use the name conjectures:
A hypothesis is something which looks as if it might be true and
were true, and which is capable of verication or refutation by com-
parison with facts. The best hypothesis, in the sense of the one
most recommending itself to the inquirer, is the one which can be
the most readily refuted if it is false. (Peirce 1955, p.54)
For Peirce, predictions are predictions of facts since events/observations are hap-
hazard (Peirce 1955, p.47). We will take a compatible but alternative view: we
shall call prediction an expected observation based upon the known facts and
logical/deductive elaborations. To produce a prediction we have to elaborate
our known facts and, before verication, we have to provide the particularities
4(unpredicted elements) that move us back to SW from the IW. In mathematics,
the map Π would be called a projection and the predictive mapping, Γ, is named
a lift5, while we will use the symbol φ to denote the rational elaboration of
ideas. When dealing with spontaneous observations the need for Γ may appear
unjustied, but if we are to conceive experiments to test a theory, Γ is a most
relevant object that tells us what to expect, and it is this expectation what is
really confronted against experimental results. 6Figure 1 shows this outlined
schema of science.
There are three conditions to be satised for the schema to be consistent.
If we ideate a set of particular observations name the particularism by α to
construct a theory, Π({Obs}α), when we interpret the ideas in the theory using
the same particularism, Γα (Π({Obs}α), we must recover the observed,
Γα (Π({Obs}α)) = Obsα (1)
4We use particularities in the sense given by Peirce in the following expression:
But observed facts relate exclusively to the particular circumstances that hap-
pened to exist when they were observed. They do not relate to any future
occasions upon which we may be in doubt how we ought to act. They, therefore,
do not, in themselves, contain any practical knowledge. (Peirce 1955, p. 150)
5The word lift takes in mathematics a related but dierent meaning in the context of
bred spaces. Here Π is a projection that produces an abstract idea from observations, an
idea that ts them all, and can rightly be called the essence of the phenomena. Thus,
Π : SW 7→ IW is the structure of the bred space with base IW . The bre, what has been
identied to a neutral element, 0, is the set of circumstances or arbitrariness, {α}. Given the
arbitrariness and the base, Γ produces a reconstruction of SW . In mathematics, the lift would
connect SW with (IW, {α}). We use the name in a more colloquial form as the collection of
inverses of Π restricted to the observations with arbitrariness α.
6Hertz (1893, p.20) makes this matter clear:
Notwithstanding the greatest admiration for Maxwell's mathematical concep-
tions, I have not always felt quite certain myself of having grasped the physical
signicance of his statements. Hence it was not possible for me to be guided in
my experiments directly by Maxwell's book.












Figure 1: The proposed schema of Science. Π is a projection that produces the
real out of the observed, φ stands for a theoretical elaboration (which eventually
can be none, in such a case φ is the identity Id) and Γ is the interpretation that
produces an expected observation.
Thus, Γα ◦Π acts as the identity within particularism α. Correspondingly, if we
produce the theory out of an interpreted set of concepts and relations, Π (Γα(τ)),
we should get the original set of concepts and relations τ constituting the theory
Π (Γα(τ)) = τ (2)
The above conditions should hold for any set of particular observations. Fur-
thermore, if our theory shall not be considered refuted, we should have that
Γβ (φ(Π({Obs}α)) ≡ Γβ ◦ φ ◦Π ({Obs}α) = {Obs}β (3)
i.e., that the theoretical conclusions elaborated by a set of observations with
particularities α can be lifted to a corresponding set of observations Obsβ with
particularity β. For the special case in which φ presents no elaboration (i.e.,
φ = Id), eq.(3) represents the standard requirement of reproducibility of exper-
iments. The set of functions {φ} are automorphisms of IW while the transfor-
mations Tβα among particular representations,
Tβα = Γβ ◦Π ({·}α)
are automorphisms of SW.
The structure arising from the triple {Π, φ,Γ} corresponds to the idea of
abduction-based reasoning, discussed in (Peirce 1955, p 150-156). Let us con-
sider it in more detail.
The projection Π should not be mistaken for induction or inductive infer-
ence. Π conjectures and suggests which is the nature of relevant observations,
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φ elaborates the ideation following the rules of mathematical logic and Γ con-
fronts the elaborated ideas against the sensible world. In this sense, Γ can be
called interpretation, connecting the ideas with the sensible world. If the con-
frontation is successful, we preliminarily accept the conjecture as a satisfactory
explanation. If, on the contrary, the conjecture is refuted, we abandon it and
proceed to generate a new, improved, conjecture in the light of the refutation.
This last process is illustrated by the backwards path in Figure 1 indicating that
disagreements between predictions and facts trigger improvements in Π. Also,
if the conjecture does not contribute to organise and structure our views on the
sensible world, it is rejected. Conjectures that are impossible to test must be
rejected as well (Peirce 1955, p 150-151). Contemporary readers may recognise
some of these ideas in Popper. Apart from precedence, Peirce goes further in
his insight on Π.
Neither Π nor Γ are deductive or inductive. The only truly deductive part
of the process lies in φ. Science cannot be reduced to logic only.
2.1 Subjective formulations and the no arbitrariness prin-
ciple
According to Peirce (p. 150, 1955)
All our knowledge may be said to rest upon observed facts. It is
true that there are psychological states which antecede our observing
facts as such.
Peirce found no reason to expect a relevant inuence of such psychological
states but such an idea must be reconsidered after Jean Piaget (1999), because
at least the notion of space, fundamental to physics, is a notion produced in
the early development of the child. Then, the space, an a-priori of knowledge in
Kant, needs to be accounted for. Because the abducting map, Π, represents the
process of ideation governed by intuition, the resulting theories quite often carry
some degree of arbitrariness introduced by the subjective perception. Newton's
mechanics, for example, is of such quality. Such subjective formulation of theo-
ries are in the same relation with the real than the observable. Correspondingly,
the schema of Figure 1 applies as well.
It is at this point where the present discussion encounters Leibniz' princi-
ple of sucient reason (Ballard 1960). Weyl (2015) introduced an elaboration
based upon it as the principle of symmetry in relation to the duality subjective-
objective, yet he failed to identify properly the automorphism that had to be
considered (Nozick 1998; Catren 2009; Fortin and Lombardi 2015). The group
of automorphisms that is relevant in this case is the group of arbitrariness with
morphisms that map the expression of a natural law in terms of some arbitrary
elections, to the corresponding expression under a dierent arbitrariness. Such is
the case of Cartesian space which is often prescribed by a reference point and or-
thogonal frame. The transformations between such reference frames correspond
to the elements in the Euclidean group in three dimensions, E3, consisting of
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the semi-direct product of translations and orthogonal transformations (reec-
tions and rotations). Thus, for example, the spatial relations between N bodies
(assumed point-like) can be written as set of 3N Cartesian coordinates, R3N ,
yet what is real in it is the projection made by modding away the group of
arbitrariness, E3, this is R3N/E3, Leibniz' relational or objective space.
The requirement of objectivity (or intersubjectivity) imposes the composi-
tion of transformations to be associative (hence automorphisms), since e.g.,
Tβα = TβδTδα = Tβδ(TδηTηα) = (TβδTδη)Tηα (4)
regardless of any particularity (opinions in the wording of Peirce) of δ, η.
Hence,
Theorem 1. The transformations between arbitrary representations of SW
form a group.
Proof. This group is called the group of arbitrariness of the theory. The exis-
tence of identity transformations follows from eq.((1)), that of inverse transfor-
mations from eq.((2)) and the equivalence in front of arbitrary particularities,
while associativity follows from eq.(4).
The no arbitrariness principle (NAP) reads (H G Solari and M A Natiello
2018):
Principle 1. [ No Arbitrariness Principle (NAP)] No knowledge of Nature
depends on arbitrary decisions.
2.2 Symmetry in the perception of electromagnetic waves
In the same way in which an elephant is perceived dierently from dierent
perspectives while still being the same elephant 7, light is perceived in dier-
ent forms (wavelength and frequency) under dierent circumstances of relative
motion between source and observer (detector). This is known as the Doppler
eect (Dingle 1960b; Mandelberg and Witten 1962) and it is not a case of arbi-
trariness: an observer moving with relative velocity, v, with respect to a source
of electromagnetic waves perceives dierent colours according to the relative
velocity. Here we understand as relative velocity what we construct intuitively
and express in formulae in elementary texts of physics. It is worth to remember
that relative velocities, in classical terms, correspond to an intuited objective
concept than can measured. We select this example as it will make contact with
Section 4.
The standard electromagnetic theory in physics textbooks relates the ob-
servation made by an observer at rest (relative to the source) to those made
by observers in relative motion, applying a transformation to the action-elds
associated to the source. The perceived elds can be obtained by the proper
use of a Lorentz Transformation (LT) of the elds or associated potentials. This
7A metaphor taken from (Catren 2009)
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theory has not been refuted so far although the constant value of the speed of
light remains in a status of conjecture (Dingle 1960a; Moon and Spencer 1960;
Bilbao 2016). Consider the perceptions of two observers that move with velocity
u and v, respectively, with respect to the source. To predict the observation of
the second one knowing the perception of the rst one, we can go back to the
perception of a privileged observer at rest with respect to the source and next
transform the result to the perception of the second observer. In symbols we
apply Lv ◦ L−u (where Lv stands for a LT of parameter v) to the four-vector
(A, V ) of potentials in Lorenz gauge obtaining (E,B) following the general pre-
scription. Although the composition of Lorentz transformations is not in general
a Lorentz transformation, the operation is an element of the Poincaré-Lorentz
group (Poincaré 1906).
3 The concept of science from Hertz to Einstein
and Popper
Towards the second half of the XIX century, the force of the Enlightenment
was declining in Europe while the second industrial revolution was developing.
Important changes took place in philosophy, physics and mathematics.
The XIX century in philosophy experienced the entrance of materialism in
the scene with naturalism taking a dominant role after Darwin, its struggles
with metaphysics, and for the natural sciences began some sort of independi-
sation from philosophy, a process that was intensied during the XX century
(Beiser 2014).
On the side of physics, the success of electromagnetic theory raised the issue
of the nature of light and electromagnetic phenomena as opposed to mechanical
phenomena. While the Newtonian grounds of mechanics seemed solid, instan-
taneous action at a distance could not be harmonised with the fact that elec-
tromagnetic phenomena appear to propagate with nite velocity. At the same
time, the way of conceiving electrodynamic phenomena shifted from hypotheses
non ngo (I frame no hypotheses8) (Newton 1687, p. 506) to the Bild (Dieter
1998; Heidelberger 1998; Homann 1998; D'Agostino 2004; Schiemann 1998)
concept (see below for a brief explanation).
In contrast with the motion of bodies addressed by mechanics, electromag-
netic phenomena reach us mostly in a form not apt for being directly intuited.
We do not see currents, for example, what we see is rather the deection of
a needle, while the current is inferred. Scientists as Lord Kelvin and Maxwell
supported their thoughts with analogies. Lord Kelvin writes
I never satisfy myself until I can make a mechanical model of a thing.
8
I frame no hypothesis; for whatever not deduced from the phenomena is to be
called a hypothesis; and hypothesis, whether metaphysical or physical, whether
of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy.
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If I can make a mechanical model I can understand it. As long as
I cannot make a mechanical model all the way through I cannot
understand; and that is why I cannot get the electromagnetic theory.
(Thompson 2011, p.835).
while Maxwell says:
Now we are unable to conceive propagation in time, except either as
the ight of a material substance through space, or as the propaga-
tion of a condition of motion or stress in a medium already existing
in space.[...] If something is transmitted from one particle to another
at a distance, what is its condition after it has left the one particle
and before it has reached the other? ([866], Maxwell 1873)
Indeed, light-travel is understood by analogies with bodies (we return to this idea
in Section 4), still in our days, like a stone thrown by the source and captured
by the detector. Also, electromagnetic waves were conceived mechanically and
asked for a propagation medium that could sustain them after having abandoned
the source and before reaching the detector.
A most decisive epistemological change was advanced by Hertz, a disciple
of Helmholtz, who acted the idea that it is possible to separate the process of
construction of a theory from the theory's mathematical content. Regarding
Maxwell's electrodynamics, he states (Hertz 1893, p.21)
To the question: 'What is Maxwell's theory?'. I know of no shorter
or more denite answer than the following: Maxwell's theory is
Maxwell's system of equations. Every theory which leads to the
same system of equations, and therefore comprises the same possi-
ble phenomena, I would consider as being a form or special case of
Maxwell's theory;[...]
Hertz claimed that theories have to be provided with what he called interpreta-
tion, an element that runs alongside the mathematics and helps in constructing
experiments related to theory (the action of Γ in Section 2) while at the same
time theory can be detached from its construction. Several inequivalent inter-
pretations can, in this form, be attached to a theory. Hertz' deep epistemological
change has been highlighted by D'Agostino:
...by separating the mathematical structure of a theory from its
modes of representation he [Hertz] has profoundly challenged the
conception of a physical theory as an indivisible unity of the two
 a conception accepted by Maxwell and other nineteenth century
mathematical physicists. (D'Agostino 1968; D'Agostino 2004).
The Berlin school of Physics (see Footnote 3) made other profound contribu-
tions to epistemology. They introduced the Bild (Dieter 1998; Heidelberger
1998; Homann 1998; D'Agostino 2004; Schiemann 1998) approach, a form of
understanding supported in images. As a brief explanation:
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For Hertz, in contrast [with Helmholtz], representations of theories
are signs of sensory impressions that are given to us. Only if we
use theory to construct representations will it accomplish the most
important task of natural knowledge, foresight of the future from
experiences of the past. (Heidelberger 1998)
Conceptually, since mental images are the outcome of sensorial perception, using
images to organise understanding implies to habilitate sensorial based intuition
to be used by analogy in other realms.
According to Poincaré, there was a crisis in mathematical physics by 1904
(Poincaré 1913, original of September 1904). And indeed there was a deep crisis,
the task of mathematicians at producing physical theories had been transferred
to a new specialist: the theoretical physicist (Jungnickel and McCormmach
2017) and even more, philosophers no longer exercised critical thinking in mat-
ters of science, at least in Germany. From Kant, through Reinhold, Fichte until
Hegel, the prevalent movement considered that philosophy was 'the guardian
of the sciences,' their founder and systematizer (Beiser 2014, p. 15). But the
movements that emerged after Hegel were mostly antihegelian. Peirce com-
ments:
German universities for a whole generation turned the cold shoulder
to every man who did not extol their stale Hegelianism, until it be-
came a stench in the nostrils of every man of common sense. Then
the ocial fashion shifted, and a Hegelian is today treated in Ger-
many with the same arrogant stupidity with which an anti-Hegelian
formerly was.(CP 1.77, Hartshorne and Weiss 1931)
For the new German philosophy the task of philosophy with respect to the sci-
ences ranged from studying the logic of the science as acted by the scientists, to
the extreme of the sciences declaring philosophy dead, as in ...neo-Kantian Jür-
gen Bona Meyer: 'The daughters now demand independence from their common
mother, and they do not suer it gladly when they are supervised or corrected;
they would prefer that their old and morose mother lay herself to rest in her
grave' (quotations from (Beiser 2014, pp.18, 17)).
Poincaré made an attempt to rescue some of the learnings of the old science
(as he called it) in terms of principles that have been established by the old
science and appeared to him as foundational. Among them the Principle of
relativity, the Principle of minimal action, conservation of energy, Carnot's 2nd
law of thermodynamics and a few others. But he realised that these principles
themselves were in crisis as well. It is interesting from the point of view of the
present work to quote some of his words regarding the crisis of the Principle of
relativity (Poincaré 1913, original in french of September 1904)
Let us pass to the principle of relativity: this not only is conrmed
by daily experience, not only is it a necessary consequence of the
hypothesis of central forces, but it is irresistibly imposed upon our
good sense, and yet it also is assailed. Consider two electried bod-
ies; though they seem to us at rest, they are both carried along by
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the motion of the earth; an electric charge in motion, Rowland has
taught us, is equivalent to a current; these two charged bodies are,
therefore, equivalent to two parallel currents of the same sense and
these two currents should attract each other. In measuring this at-
traction, we shall measure the velocity of the earth; not its velocity
in relation to the sun or the xed stars, but its absolute velocity.
I well know what will be said: It is not its absolute velocity that is
measured, it is its velocity in relation to the ether. How unsatisfac-
tory that is! Is it not evident that from the principle so understood
we could no longer infer anything? It could no longer tell us any-
thing just because it would no longer fear any contradiction. If we
succeed in measuring anything, we shall always be free to say that
this is not the absolute velocity, and if it is not the velocity in rela-
tion to the ether, it might always be the velocity in relation to some
new unknown uid with which we might ll space.
Here, Poincaré's criticism is aligned with Peirce's position, at least inasmuch he
refuses to make non-refutable hypothesis.
The crisis identied by Poincaré proceeded with a new turn. By allowing free
interpretations, the velocities involved in electromagnetism, that had been fully
measurable relational velocities in Ampère, Faraday and Weber's experiments
as well as in Maxwell's abduction, were reinterpreted in dierent ways. In
their expressions of forces, and the derivation of them, Maxwell works with
relative velocities between circuits (Maxwell 1873). Lorentz (1892) reinterpreted
relative velocities as absolute velocities referring to the ether in its expression
of the electromagnetic force. Later (Einstein 1905) kept Lorentz expression
of the force while eradicating the ether, what implies another reinterpretation
of the involved velocities, as velocities with respect to an inertial frame, and
proposing to use Lorentz' transformations in place of Galilean boosts to restore
the Relativity principle. In so doing, he was loyal to Hertz epistemological point
of view, changing the interpretation of the glyphs of Maxwell's electrodynamics
without changing the glyphs of the theory.
We have chosen Popper's Logic of Scientic Research to represent the alter-
native to the epistemology schematically presented in Section (2) that evolved
from the Berlin school. Popper's view of the philosophy of sciences is well
aligned with the post-Hegelians:
I suggest that it is the task of the logic of scientic discovery, or the
logic of knowledge, to give a logical analysis of this procedure; that
is, to analyse the method of the empirical sciences.(Popper 1959,
p.4)
From pages 3 to 7 he address the problem of induction, concluding that induction
is not the support of trust in science. He next writes against psychologism,
The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems
to me neither to call for logical analysis nor to be susceptible of it.
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The question how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man
whether it is a musical theme, a dramatic conict, or a scientic
theorymay be of great interest to empirical psychology; but it is
irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientic knowledge. (p. 7) [...]
returning recurrently to his main thesis:
According to the view that will be put forward here, the method of
critically testing theories, and selecting them according to the results
of tests, always proceeds on the following lines. From a new idea, put
up tentatively, and not yet justied in any wayan anticipation,
a hypothesis, a theoretical system, or what you willconclusions
are drawn by means of logical deduction. These conclusions are then
compared with one another and with other relevant statements, so as
to nd what logical relations (such as equivalence, derivability, com-
patibility, or incompatibility) exist between them. (p. 9, emphasis
added)
We have highlighted two expressions that give the clear impression that for
Popper theories come from nowhere, leaving the process of production as not
belonging to science. In short, for Popper the phenomenological moment ap-
pears as non-scientic.
By rejecting induction, branding other elements in the process of the con-
struction of theories as psychologism and ignoring abduction in its original form
he comes into terms with Einstein's view
Physics constitutes a logical system of thought which is in a state of
evolution, and whose basis cannot be obtained through distillation
by any inductive method from the experiences lived through, but
which can only be attained by free invention. The justication (truth
content) of the system rests in the proof of usefulness of the resulting
theorems on the basis of sense experiences, where the relations of the
latter to the former can only be comprehended intuitively. Evolution
is going on in the direction of increasing simplicity of the logical
basis. (Einstein 1940)
The Einstein-Popper view disregards the abduction Π, which is replaced by
free invention and put outside science, this is, outside logical examination.
As free invention, the replacement of a concept in a formulae by another one
must be admitted, although its immediate consequence is that the new theory
must be put to test from scratch (see (Popper 1959, p. 63)). Popper does not
address how we go from glyphs into experiments, he apparently ignores Γ as well.
Einstein instead introduces intuition as part of the assessment of the truth
content. This intuition shall not be confused with Husserl's eidetic intuition,
that goes from the observed to the facts, for this one moves in the opposite
direction, from theory/Ideas into observations. In any case, to restore part of the
coherence of the old science, such epistemology needs to be complemented with
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some principles such as the (intuited) Relativity principle and the requirement
of reproducibility of experiments.
It must be noticed that the absence of logical conditions for the interpreta-
tion, as those that emerge from the abduction, makes free interpretation possible
as well. The theories resulting from Popper's epistemology ought to be consid-
ered less simple (in his terms) than those supported by the present (pragmati-
cist) approach since they can elude refutations by changing the interpretation,
saving the core of mathematical relations.
4 A pragmaticist critic of Special Relativity
We want to illustrate in this section how the epistemological frame (Piaget
and García 1989)9 changes our appraisal of theories. We address the problem
in practical terms considering Special Relativity, SR, one of the theories that
prompted the need for a new epistemology as presented by Popper:
[Referring to other epistemological approaches] They will hardly be
ready to grant this dignity to modern theoretical physics in which
I and others see the most complete realization to date of what I
call `empirical science'. [...] Thus I freely admit that in arriving
at my proposals I have been guided, in the last analysis, by value
judgments and predilections. (Popper 1959, p. 15)
Einstein as well as Poincaré (or any other scientist that we know about since
them) have presented the Principle of Relativity as a truism, a self evident prin-
ciple; Poincaré admitting, additionally, physicists' habituation to it by what he
called the old science (Henri Poincaré 1913). The principle will make no sense
to the lay man unless she/he has been initiated in the mathematics of classical
mechanics. It is a common experience to nd students from the humanities
that believe they agree with Einstein as they profess philosophical relativism
10. Habituation in classical mechanics is then the source of it, since without
habituation the belief does not emerge.
The present pragmaticist view indicates that the Principle of Relativity in
classical mechanics is not a new or independent principle, but rather the con-
sequence of requiring a rational foundation for our understanding and therefore
eliminating arbitrariness. It is supported in the relational view of mechanics that
goes back to Leibniz (H G Solari and M A Natiello 2018) and we have called
it the Non arbitrariness principle (NAP). In some sense, it integrates Newton's
mechanics with Leibniz' objections, thus extending beyond both. This form of
surpass imposes that the mappings connecting presentations of dynamical pro-
cesses under dierent arbitrary conditions constitute a group (a mathematical
9Generally speaking, an epistemological frame provides an a-priori form of organising con-
cepts, formulating questions, producing and presenting answers. As such, it can discard
questions as unsuitable or lacking interest and even produce blindness as in the example
presented in (Rolando García 1981). Moreover, the same question/answer might have com-
pletely dierent lectures depending on the epistemological frame.
10https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/ (accessed May 13 2021)
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structure of associative binary operations having inverse and identity opera-
tion). In classical mechanics one of the groups relating arbitrary (subjective)
choices is the group of Galilean transformations, eliminating the arbitrariness
in the relative motion between reference systems. Relativity proposes to replace
Galileo's transformations by Lorentz transformations (LT). Under the pragmati-
cist schema it is then necessary that the LT's constitute a group (which they
don't) and that they eliminate the corresponding arbitrariness in the relative
motion between reference systems. Nothing is gained by enlarging these trans-
formations with the full Poincaré-Lorentz group (PL), the arbitrariness cannot
be fully eliminated.
The questions are: which is the residual arbitrariness that remains? How
was it introduced in Special Relativity?
These questions examine the axioms and the inference (abduction) leading to
the axioms, i.e., they concern the projection Π, before refutation or verication
can enter the discussion. Therefore its criticism lies outside Popper's epistemic
approach and outside the orthodox approach (as described by Feigl (1970)) as
well.
4.1 The algebraic structure associated to Lorentz's trans-
formations
The analysis of the PL group in relation with Einstein's velocity addition is
presented in e.g., (Gilmore 1974), while some results were known since the early
days of SR (Silberstein 1914, p. 161-169). For our goal it is sucient to realise
that the consecutive application of two LT's is not in general another LT:
LvLu = Lv⊕uR(v,u) = R(v,u)Lu⊕v
Here L stands for the dierent LT's, v ⊕ u is Einstein's velocity addition and
R(v,u) is a rotation named Wigner or Thomas rotation11 depending on the
source. This is not a property deduced through a pictorial presentation of the
problem12, but rather a fundamental property of the PL group, independent of
the form in which we may want to present SR. The standard claim that the LT
maps the results from one inertial system to another (originated in Einstein's
paper) cannot be sustained, no matter the amount of mathematics thrown over
the problem. To save the theory (the equations), the least that is needed
is to reinterpret its symbols, but such a thing is alien to the pragmaticist
epistemology. Thus, for the pragmaticist the theory is inconsistent with the
abduction process used in its construction and must be abandoned or built from
the grounds specifying the phenomenological map from the beginning.
To further grasp the issue we may try to solve the following problem: an
observer, S, associates reference systems to two bodies, A,B, moving with veloc-
ities vA and vB relative to S along dierent directions. Given these measurable
11Wigner rotation (accessed 14 May 2021)
12Since pictures relate to our intuitive view of world, pictures may inadvertently introduce
elements alien to the problem.
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velocities we attempt to provide the velocity vBA of B relative to A that allows
a direct description by A of the motion of B and vice versa (as a function of
quantities pertaining only to A and B, in order to preserve objectivity). This
is, the velocity involved in the LT relating both systems.
According to the received wisdom we use successive LT's to change the de-
scription to a reference system SA where the body A is at rest (or alternatively
SB where B is at rest). Further, the theory claims that the velocity of B as
described by A, vAB , must relate to the velocity of A as described by B, v
B
A in
the form vAB = −vBA (a well-known property in everyday life, and a cornerstone
of classical mechanics demanded as well by Einstein (1905) in his construction).
However, what is computed via the PL group does not relate in that way, as
noted by Silberstein (Silberstein 1914, p. 167). To save the formulas (the the-
ory, in Popper's epistemology) we may want to claim that we can still rotate
the frames so that the computed velocities satisfy the demanded property (al-
though the theory has no prescription for this operation), but this would imply
that the transformation from one system to another depends on the presence of
other non-interacting bodies. Hence, rather than a transformation between the
frames of A and B it is a transformation between the frames A and B in the
presence of the witness S. The inconsistency detected by Silberstein cannot be
removed.
At this point we must remark that the use we make of the Lorentz transfor-
mation in Subsection 2.2 is not subject to the present criticism. In that case,
the PL group does not act as an arbitrariness relating group but rather as a
group relating perceptions under dierent physical circumstances in which the
frame of the source has a natural right to be distinguished.
Following critical thinking we must trace the problem backwards to uncover
its roots. We undertake this task in the coming subsection.
4.2 Einstein's inference
Einstein's fundamental paper (Einstein 1905) rests on a few hypotheses that
are almost taken for granted. In the rst paragraph it is stated that physical
phenomena depend on relative motion (of the interacting parts), suggesting
that relative velocity is a well-dened concept. This idea is completed in Part
I, 3 stating that the velocity v of A with respect to B is minus the velocity
of B with respect to A, inasmuch the transformation between two reference
systems in relative motion depends on the same function of v or −v, being the
transformations inverse of each other. At the beginning of Part I 3, it is stated
that these reference systems are parallel orthogonal Cartesian reference frames
(throughout the motion) that can be chosen so that one of the axes lies along
the direction of motion. No special notion of parallel is introduced, so we must
accept it is the standard notion.
The above observations, although obvious for classical physics, conict with
the fundamental requirements of special relativity (SR). Indeed, the relative
velocity of SR makes sense only for a given pair of reference frames (or parti-
cles/bodies). In the original wording: the stationary frame S and the moving
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frame A. When incorporating a third frame B, moving relative to the stationary
frame along a direction not collinear with SA, the demand imposed by eq.(4)
cannot be fullled. There is no way to establish the velocity of B relative to
A by coordinate transformations without involving S, hence the concept is not
objective, since a relational quantity between two objects can only be computed
through the point of view of a third object; what we have is opinion (what we
actually have is the subjective view of S about what vAB and v
B
A should be).
A second hypothesis, to which the vast majority of the scientic community
has adhered over the years is that light travels or propagates through space,
departing from the emitter and arriving at a later time to the detector. We call
this the body-like conception of light propagation, since it corresponds to the
motion of a material projectile. The idea of the photon inherits this conception.
The body-like approach was mostly bound to the need for a propagating medium
(the ether) for electromagnetic disturbances. However, (Einstein 1905) considers
concepts such as the luminiferous ether or the need for an absolute stationary
space superuous13. In the second half of the XIX century, electrodynamics
not resorting to the ether comes almost solely from the Göttingen school (Betti
1867; Riemann 1867; Neumann 1868) being most clearly exposed by Lorenz
(Lorenz 1867).
In conclusion, Einstein (1905) rests upon at least four hypothesis:
1. There exists an objective velocity between reference frames (observers)
(call it v). By objective we mean that can be measured one form or
another by any observer, obtaining the same vector, i.e., the velocity is
real in the terms of Peirce.
2. The same laws of electrodynamics and optics will be valid for all frames
of reference for which the equations of mechanics hold good (Principle of
relativity).
3. Light travels body-like (substantialist hypothesis). This contrasts with
Lorenz electrodynamics, which is compatible with assuming that light
does not travel, but is the result of a time-delayed interaction between
source and target.
4. Light is always propagated in empty space with a denite velocity C which
is independent of the state of motion of the emitting body.
Hypothesis 1 and 3 are hidden, used as true in the argumentation but not made
explicit. As a result of them, Einstein concludes that the transformations of the
descriptions from one inertial frame to another one are those of Lorentz, which
depend on the velocity v. The problem is then how to measure v? We have
13Einstein will later reject this idea, stating that every theory has its ether (Einstein 1924,
p. 93), an issue which is seldom discussed in textbooks: [...], we will not be able to do without
the aether in theoretical physics, that is, a continuum endowed with physical properties; for
general relativity, to whose fundamental viewpoints physicists will always hold fast, rules out
direct action at a distance.
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argued in the previous subsection that there is no such v consistent with the
hypotheses.
Actually, hypothesis 1 and 2 are supported by the conception of science
presented in Section 2; one of the fundamental tasks of a relativity principle
is precisely to assure that v is objective and not an opinion. Hypothesis 3
is imposed by the epistemological frame14, while hypothesis 4 is a conjecture
supported in part by realism: if we cannot make dierence between light as
perceived when we are at rest or in motion relative to the source, we would
expect the description of light to be the same in all systems where we place a
set of detectors which are at rest from one another.
Since there is a contradiction, we should be forced to abandon at least one
hypothesis. Abandoning hypotheses 1 or 2 means to leave realism behind. Aban-
doning 3 has little costs since it simply introduces an analogy, a relation between
matters that we know are not equivalent but we decided to explore as such to
get further insight. Analogies have only two possible nal destinations, either
they become equivalences or they are no longer used when we progress in our
understanding. Hypothesis 4 should be put to experimental test.
The body-like conception of light refers to an epistemological frame dier-
ent and incompatible with the relational conception. A neat example of the
relevance of the epistemological frame is Michelson-Morley's experiment, that
only makes sense if performed for electric disturbances travelling through the
ether, opening for questions about velocities with respect to it. Within a rela-
tional view, this experiment makes little sense, since source and detector are at
relative rest. Another example, also in this eld, are the experiments (mainly
by Graneau (P. Graneau and N. Graneau 1996)) attempting to decide between
Ampère's and Lorentz' electromagnetic forces. The same experiments receive a
dierent interpretation in each of the two epistemological frames and in the end
the issue is still undecided. A comprehensive discussion can be found in (Assis
1994).
5 Maxwell and the propagation of light
The body-like conception of light propagation is present in Maxwell, as discussed
in the previous section, and lies as a support for the ether, that would be the
medium through which light is travelling, in analogy with mechanical waves.
While the quoted paragraph from Maxwell (see Section 3) supports the idea of
the ether, Maxwell and also Faraday entertained doubts in this respect. The
context of the quoted paragraph is to claim the right to investigate this physical
hypothesis, strongly opposed by the Göttingen school that he much admired.
In the same form, Maxwell wrote for and against the Göttingen approach. In
what can be considered the most balanced expression, he writes
14Einstein denes velocity as distance
time interval
which is in fact an objective (invariant, real) ve-
locity in classical mechanics but he later uses
|X(t1)−X(t0)|
t1−t0
which is a subjective velocity that
changes with reference frame. For the dierence between objective and subjective velocities
see (H G Solari and M A Natiello 2018).
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That theories apparently so fundamentally opposed should have so
large a eld of truth common to both is a fact the philosophical im-
portance of which we cannot fully appreciate till we have reached a
scientic altitude from which the true relation between hypotheses so
dierent can be seen.(Maxwell 2003, p. 228) (Address to the Mathe-
matical and Physical Sections of the British Association. (Liverpool,
September 15, 1870.))
To his disappointment, the existence of the ether was refuted by experiments
while the relational theories were abandoned by adherence to substantialism.
We defer to the Appendix a deeper discussion of this point.
It is important to notice that Maxwell's analogies using the ether produce
some lasting contributions, like the displacement current. However, the dis-
placement current can be produced without invoking the ether through the
strategy of the Göttingen school: if there is evidence that electromagnetic dis-
turbances propagate as waves, write it in formulae, i.e., build the corresponding
phenomenological map. In contrast, Maxwell's expression for the electrome-
chanical force was rejected by experiments. The currently accepted electro-
magnetic force was produced by Lorentz arguing from the ether, but with a
curiosity: the virtual displacements of the probe he used were at the same
time displacements with respect to the ether and with respect to the remaining
electromagnetic objects (Lorentz 1892, 71). Hence, his argument holds true
not because of the ether (call it free thinking) but because it once again agrees
with the relational point of view. A recent discussion contains the details of the
calculation (M. Natiello and H. Solari 2021).
6 Concluding Remarks
We have discussed the logical requirements implied in the traditional conception
of science and compared to new concepts socially dominant since the beginning
of the XX century. We have further shown than the traditional concept has
a certain unifying power with respect to beliefs such as the requirement of
reproducibility of experiments and symmetry requirements of scientic laws (in
particular of physical laws). Additionally, the concept of science put forward is
operative since it allows us to check the construction of theories (as it has been
shown in Section (4)), implying as well that the sciences cannot be considered
autonomous and much less independent of philosophy.
It is worth to be noticed that the scheme of Figure 1 operates not only at
the level of completed theories but during the production of them as well. In
our experience, the construction of theories implies the scheme at every level of
detail in what can be portrayed as a fractal structure.
The replacement of the phenomenological map by free invention disproves
any attempt of studying the fundamentals. For example, we have to accept by
habit or consensus the Relativity principle without having any control of its
appropriateness or the conditions that it must satisfy. In such a form, the work
of critical philosophy as a motion towards the fundamentals (as put by Hegel) is
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hindered, with the addition of gaining freedom for interpretations, thus making
falsiability harder to assess and helping to sustain dogmatic beliefs. Also, it
made possible a continuous progress of science, without set backs, in as much
as new interpretations and physical entities (if needed) are introduced, thus
protecting the core beliefs.
The new form of science emerged in physics at the beginning of the XX cen-
tury and appears to evolve from a need for legitimating analogies. In this sense,
anthropologist Sharon Traweek in her observation of the high-energy physicists
community says:
Undergraduate physics students, to be successful, must display a
high degree of intellectual skill, particularly in analogical thinking.
The students learn from textbooks whose interpretation of physics
is not to be challenged; in fact, it is not to be seen as interpretation.
(Traweek 1992, p. 74)[...] Teachers show students how to recognize
that a new problem is like this or that familiar problem; in this intro-
duction to the repertoire of soluble problems to be memorized, the
student is taught not induction or deduction but analogic thinking.
(p. 77)
The observation gives a fair idea on how this form of thinking is trained and
selected. This shows how the epistemic frame is socially reproduced.
The price to be paid when accepting analogies is high, as SR illustrates. We
must leave behind universal time and relative positions accepting a new space-
time. We have to accept a debilitated epistemology, hidden inconsistencies in
the theory (the use of intuited velocities that cannot be measured) and we nally
have to forbid natural questions concerning non-inertial frames. In contrast, if
we accept that interactions are not bodies and hence, they do not need to have
a place in space and consequently that analogies with bodies are of limited
relevance, we not only maintain the unity of physics but strengthen it, showing
that several seemingly independent principles all correspond to a conceptual
unity. The question is unavoidable: what did we obtain paying this price? We
conjecture that the gains were social, but it deserves investigation.
With respect to Peirce's complaint regarding that the word "pragmatism"
has been kidnapped, we observe that kidnapping words is a frequent practice.
Currently most of those claiming to adhere to a relational view actually adhere
to a formal procedure that has emptied the word of meaning, since instead of
seeking for reality they make room for a world of incommensurate subjective
opinions (see (Margenau and Mould 1957) for a distinction between an older
meaning and a modern form of relativity). Even worse, the same can be
said of "critic". How can science be critic when it does not allow to search
for its fundamentals but considers only its consequences? In particular, the
consistency of the triple {Π, φ,Γ} is set aside, since both ends are debilitated or
absent. Theories should be exposed to experimental analysis, but they may be
rejected even earlier, if the phenomenological map is inadequate for the problem.
The phenomenological map connects and at the same time keeps as distin-
guished the world of ideas (IW) and the world of observations (SW). For critical
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philosophy, cognition requires both, as in Kant's dictum:
Understanding cannot intuit, and the sensuous faculty cannot think.
In no other way than from the united operation of both, can knowl-
edge arise.
The phenomenological map that represents the dialogue between the sensuous
faculty and our thoughts separates them and prevents hypostatisation, the rei-
cation of ideas. Not only Kant spoke against hypostatisation in his discussion
of metaphysics. Faraday, a Natural Philosopher, wrote:
But it is always safe and philosophic to distinguish, as much as is in
our power, fact from theory; the experience of past ages is sucient
to show us the wisdom of such a course; and considering the constant
tendency of the mind to rest on an assumption, and, when it answers
every present purpose, to forget that it is an assumption, we ought to
remember that it, in such cases, becomes a prejudice, and inevitably
interferes, more or less, with a clear-sighted judgment. (Faraday
1844, p.285)
It is not surprising then that simple considerations regarding the largely for-
gotten phenomenological map cast a distinctive light on our educated beliefs.
Against the concept of science in Einstein and Popper (Section 3) we must raise
Kant's words (we invite the reader to substitute pure reason by the sciences
in the next quotation)
Reason must be subject, in all its operations, to criticism, which
must always be permitted to exercise its functions without restraint;
otherwise its interests are imperilled and its inuence obnoxious to
suspicion. There is nothing, however useful, however sacred it may
be, that can claim exemption from the searching examination of
this supreme tribunal, which has no respect of persons. The very
existence of reason depends upon this freedom; for the voice of reason
is not that of a dictatorial and despotic power, it is rather like the
vote of the citizens of a free state, every member of which must have
the privilege of giving free expression to his doubts, and possess even
the right of veto.
But while reason can never decline to submit itself to the tribunal
of criticism, it has not always cause to dread the judgement of this
court. Pure reason, however, when engaged in the sphere of dog-
matism, is not so thoroughly conscious of a strict observance of its
highest laws, as to appear before a higher judicial reason with per-
fect condence. On the contrary, it must renounce its magnicent
dogmatical pretensions in philosophy. (Kant 1787, p. 475)
In closing, we must return the credit to the student of humanities, since every
reference system has a right to its own opinion and there is no manner of putting
them in correspondence (to mod out subjectivity, in mathematical terms),
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there is no real relative velocity, according to SR, but just opinions based upon
previous beliefs.
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A On Maxwell's argument against the Göttingen
theory
In a communication to the Royal Society read June 18, 1868 (Maxwell 2003,
pp. 125143), Maxwell comments and criticises the electromagnetic theories of
Lorenz and Riemann. He would later in practice retract from this criticism in
his treatise (Maxwell 1873), admitting that Lorenz' equations are equivalent to
his system and, as we have seen in Section 4, also in a communication addressed
to the Mathematical and Physical Sections of the British Association (Liverpool
, September 15, 1870) (Maxwell 2003, pp. 215229). Nevertheless, it is inter-
esting to use his argument to show how interpretation and analogy irrupts in
scientic argumentation even in the words of a celebrated scientist. Maxwell
writes (Maxwell 2003, pp. 137138):
For let two oppositely electried bodies A and B travel
along the line joining them with equal velocities in the di-
rection AB, then if either the potential or the attraction of
the bodies at a given time is that due to their position at
some former time (as these authors suppose), B, the fore-
most body, will attract A forwards more than A attracts B
backward. Now let A and B be kept asunder by a rigid rod. The
combined system, if set in motion in the direction AB, will pull in
that direction with a force which may either continually augment
the velocity, or may be used as an inexhaustible source of energy. I
think that these remarkable deductions from the latest developments
of Weber and Neumann's theory can only be avoided by recognizing
the action of a medium in electrical phenomena. (emphasis added)
On a technical aspect, the combined system can be described easily with
Lagrange's formulation. It results in a Lagrangian independent of time (de-
spite the retarded interaction, which is nullied by the rigid rod), meaning that
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Hamilton's function is constant in time. With the introduction of generalised
coordinates it does not require an explicit dependence on time. Hamilton's func-
tion is the energy. The system does not create energy. Furthermore, since the
interaction he considered was associated exclusively to Coulomb's potential, the
acceleration of the system is strictly zero and the potential is constant along the
trajectory. The matter illustrates the dangers in talking physics.
The highlighted part deserves further analysis. Assume the described situa-
tion is possible without coercing it through a rod. The electrical action jumps
to the space of the emitter and it delivers the action only when it is at a place
in coincidence with the receiver (it sounds pretty much like a modern photon
emitted from A towards B). Let tB be the time when the signal that left A is
sensed by B and t0 the time of emission. The distance travelled by this signal
would be then XB(tB) −XA(t0) (as measured in the frame of A, a subjective
distance see (H G Solari and M A Natiello 2018)). This coincides with the
distance travelled by a body moving in a straight line from XA(t0) to XB(tB).
In the same form, let tA be the time when the signal that left B at t0 is sensed
by A. The corresponding distance is then XA(tA)−XB(t0) (in the frame of B).
But since B is moving along the straight line AB while the signal is travelling,
we have |XB(tB) − XA(t0)| > |XA(tA) − XB(t0)|. This relationship between
positions, which is obvious for material bodies, is hence assumed to hold for
electromagnetic interactions as well. We must admit that this form of thinking
is odd: how do we know the signal jumps to the space of the receiver at the
end of the process and not at the beginning? More relevant: this interpreta-
tion breaks the original objective conception of the Göttingen school in terms
of relative positions and velocities. The relative distance between A and B is
the same as that between B and A, except for orientation. We have broken the
contract, and Equation 1 is not satised, a tribute to the use of intuitions based
upon images by analogy.
In any case, the observer that will measure the electromagnetic signal is
associated to the detector and not to the emitter. Let us say that an array of
detectors is placed in the frame of the receiver to track the electrical action. The
receiver (observer) will register the distance between source and target at the
time of emission. The action is tracked by the detectors of any observer since the
moment of emission and on this basis we can compute the velocity of the signal.
If τ is the time taken to reach the detector, we have XB(t0)−XA(t0) which is an
objective distance (equally registered from any reference system), as well as τ ,
both invariant in classical physics. Then, XB(t0)−XA(t0)τ is an invariant velocity
and there is no problem involved. All observers determine the same value. The
price paid is to leave analogies behind.
The travelled distance is a concept pertaining to absolute space. In con-
trast, we usually measure distances travelled by vehicles using an odograph.
Place a car in a freight train and deliver it to some distant place. The odograph
of the train will indicate a distance between train stops and the odograph of the
car will indicate zero. We know both readings are correct, distances travelled
are relative as well as velocities. To pretend that electromagnetic action has
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a speed solely determined by its identity is the same that asserting that light
moves in absolute space.
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